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ABSTRACT 
This article analyses the two policy moments of digital content industries policy 
development of the Keating (1992-1996) and Howard governments (2001-2004). In 
bringing these two moments into dialogue our aim is to illuminate and evaluate the 
broader policy frameworks and political and policy contexts that gave rise to and 
subsequently shaped these different digital content strategies. The Keating 
government connected culture and services to harness multimedia as vehicles for 
cultural expression and as a new economically viable growth industry suited to a 
convergent information age. The Howard government’s innovation agenda has 
reconstructed industry development priorities for the digital content industries 
influencing their conception as inputs and enablers for both the ICT and broader 
industries in an information economy framework. The article concludes with an 
evaluation of the assumptions and priorities, shortcomings and advantages of these 
two quite different approaches to developing digital content industries.  
 
Introduction 
Recently considerable research analysis and policy development activity has occurred 
in digital content production in Australia with the launch of the multifaceted three 
stage Creative Industries Cluster Study (CICS, 2002-2003), the Broadband Production 
Fund, the related launch of a new policy framework for broadband (NOIE 2003) and 
the extension of existing framework for the ICT industries (DCITA, 2003a). There 
has not been a time since the ‘heyday’ of the Keating Labor Government in the early 
1990s where content industries and broadband have been so foregrounded in policy 
research and development activity. The earlier Creative Nation (CoA, 1994) period 
received considerable attention at the time of its release in part because of the scale of 
the governmental commitment (a planned $256 million). By contrast the current 
intense digital content and application moment has received little public attention and 
its connections with the previous moment have gone largely unremarked. This is not 
surprising given that this policy research activity is yet to be translated into sustained 
action frameworks or funding commitment from government with the 2004 Federal 
Budget particularly disappointing in this regard. However this policy activity shows 
that the digital content industries are on the radar of communications policy 
development in ways they have not been since 1996.  
 
In bringing these two moments into dialogue our aim is to illuminate and evaluate the 
broader policy frameworks and political and policy contexts that gave rise to and 
subsequently shaped these different digital content strategies.1 The Keating 
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government was preoccupied by the conjunction of “culture and services” in an 
attempt to bring together culture and services into a single, overarching and connected 
policy framework (Spurgeon 1998: 23). This fitted its priority of approaching cultural 
industries from ‘an industry perspective as well as a cultural one’ (Santamaria quoted 
in Gibson 1999: 113). By contrast the Howard government articulates an innovation 
agenda within which the industry development priorities for the digital content 
industries need to situate themselves. Consequently these industries are seen to 
provide inputs to both the ICT industry and other industries. In doing so digital 
content is partially disconnected from the cultural sector to better develop its 
contribution to the broader information economy.  
 
Both governments share a common concern for ‘whole of government’ policy 
coordination. For Keating the multimedia and creative infrastructure was central to a 
broader cultural strategy which was integrally connected to concerns for the remaking 
of national identity and the building of a ‘clever’ multicultural nation in the Asia-
Pacific region. For Howard the digital content industries are a contributory component 
to the broader ICT industries which underpins his innovation strategy, Backing 
Australia’s Ability (Mark I, 1998 and Mark II, 2004). His strategic policy framework 
is centrally concerned with the ‘national innovation system’ comprising science, 
technology, business, education and government. In the Labor strategy a multimedia 
industry was to be kick-started to help realise a whole of government strategy while 
the Coalition strategy has been to reconnect the digital content industries to a whole of 
government approach which has largely bypassed them. In the first multimedia was 
central to a government’s political identity while in the second the digital content 
industries are the “tail on the ICT dog”.  
 
Although driven by different political philosophies, policy priorities and objectives, 
both governments shared the priority of stewarding Australia towards an information-
dominant society. They were each concerned with the problem of managing societal 
and industrial transition to a society shaped by the “information revolution” (the first) 
and information and communications technology (ICT) in an ‘information’ and 
‘knowledge-based economy’ (the second). Thereafter their priorities diverge. For the 
Keating government, the development of a viable content production industry able to 
compete in international content markets was an essential part of a broader strategy to 
develop an inclusive information society and economy. While for the Howard 
government, the Australian information economy is to be determined by the 
development, diffusion and exploitation of a dynamic ICT sector (DCITA 2003a) –
content provides in this context an innovating and enabling component for this 
underlying driver of the broader information economy. These differences ensure that 
in the Keating period the multimedia industry was situated within a combined cultural 
policy and services policy framework which projected likely multimedia, broadband 
and superhighway futures; while in the Howard period the digital content and 
applications (hereafter DC&A) industries are handled within an ICT policy 
framework emphasising innovation and industry development. The attention within 
this framework is on study: mapping existing creative industries developments to  
provide a premise for potential industry policy formulation and better inform existing 
policy priorities on ICT, R&D, and innovation. 
 
Each policy moment spells out in considerable detail particular ways of looking, 
conceiving and analysing the multimedia and digital content industries for which 
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policy is being developed. In circumstances where broadband, multimedia and 
information superhighway were coming into being as new problems for government, 
policy makers needed to build a picture of these and their connection with each other 
and this entailed specifying in a normative fashion the likely future, importance, and 
characteristics of each. The second policy moment, by contrast, was concerned with 
producing a new object—the digital content and applications industry—which was 
coming into being at the intersection of the ICT and creative industries and needed to 
be made sense of in relation to existing innovation and industry development 
frameworks.  
  
Centering the Creative Infrastructure for the Information Age 
Australia has the opportunity to become a world leader in the new services 
environment through the production of content - the essential element in the 
broadband and multimedia environment. (Creative Nation, CoA, 1994: 56) 
In simple terms, a home or work computer could also be a television set and 
video, a telephone, and a connection to every on-line databank. A wide range 
of information and entertainment services will be more readily available and 
easier and cheaper to find and access. There is no doubt that multimedia 
products will be the drivers of these vast new services. (Creative Nation, CoA, 
1994: 57) 
Connecting Culture and Services 
The Keating Government’s digital content strategy was designed to take Australia 
into a new services environment created by the convergence of communication, 
information and entertainment—‘broadcasting, telecommunications, computing and 
creative (i.e. film and content production) industries and technologies’ (CoA, 1994: 
56). This new services environment was characterised by the conjunction of a creative 
infrastructure and a communications infrastructure of ‘broadband’ and interim 
platforms such as CD-Rom. In a departure from precedent this policy moment 
foregrounded the creative infrastructure of creative producers and user environments 
at the expense of the communications infrastructure.  
Even the Broadband Services Expert Group (1994)—the group most charged with 
care for the emerging telecommunications infrastructure—nominated content as the 
critical issue (CoA, 1994: 56). This was because ‘we need content to develop services 
as well as to reinforce our cultural values’ (BSEG, 1994: viii). In the ‘epoch’ of the 
information superhighway content would be ‘absolutely critical’ and ‘what we put 
onto the highway … really matters’ (CoA, 1994: 55). Paying attention to the creative 
infrastructure—the creative talent pools and user environments of Commerce in 
Content (Cutler & Co, 1994)—made sense because multimedia products will drive the 
development of vast new services. The goal of developing sophisticated 
communications infrastructure depended on the availability of product, services and 
demand for these. So Australia’s opportunity in this environment lay in it becoming a 
‘world leader’ in the production and useage of content. Governmental focus therefore 
needed to be on creating product and nurturing the talent pools necessary for 
multimedia creation and developing the demand for multimedia in the new ‘era of 
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computer and communications-based interactive multimedia services’ (Cutler & Co, 
1994: 4).  
The information superhighway was here an instrument of carriage for the new 
(cultural) products and services of the impending convergence of 
telecommunications, computing, broadcasting and creative industries. The 
superhighway was therefore a conduit for content—variously programming, 
applications, and interactive multimedia. As a conduit it was subject to constraints and 
distribution bottlenecks which needed to be overcome so that the content developing 
and publishing industries in Australia could produce—and consumers access—the 
‘knowledge banks’, ‘databases’ and interactive services of ‘Australian servers and 
publishing nodes’ (Cutler & Co, 1994: 3-4). This preferred version of the information 
superhighway was characterised by speed and mobility, accessibility and openness, 
seemingly effortless multiple and simultaneous carriage, and multiple and varied uses 
of content. Content seemed here to be the crucial element in an environment where 
there would be the transmission of many broadcasts; the carriage of huge amounts of 
data, entertainment and information programming; the development of large-scale 
interactive networks placed anywhere on a continuum between the dial-up 
possibilities of pay-per-view to the routine realities of the ordinary telephone call; and 
the development of unprecedented kinds of multimedia product for these networks. 
The very existence of so much communications capacity gave content providers new 
centrality (see Figure 1 for a visual representation of this dynamic). 
Figure 1. The Multimedia Model  
 
 
Policy makers attempted to integrate the information, computing, telephony and 
broadcasting industries with the culture industries. This involved taking these 
industries out of a purely industry or service policy context where the emphasis was 
almost exclusively on ‘efficiency and productivity’ and bringing them under the aegis 
of a cultural policy framework supporting the development of a sustainable creative 
infrastructure (CoA, 1994: 55). In doing so policy makers wanted to bridge the public 
policy gaps between content and carriage, and hardware and software in 
communications (Spurgeon, 1998: 23) on the grounds that ‘the content of 
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communications services cannot be considered separately from the delivery of that 
content’ (CoA, 1994: 56). This new policy framework shifted the service industry 
focus from being on hardware and its application towards content and service 
provision (CoA, 1994: 55). Such a focus entailed a ‘new realism’ which understood 
that Australia’s opportunity lay not in hardware   – telecommunications and 
information technology –  but instead in ‘the growth options of the twenty-first 
century in service and “knowledge based” industries’ (Cutler & Co, 1994: 1). 
Information Technology (IT), it seemed, was now a part of the cultural domain: ‘IT, 
and all that it now offers, has crossed the technical rubicon into … the realm of 
culture’ (CoA, 1994: 55). As Spurgeon (1998: 23) put it the ‘information economy 
was here being discursively mobilised at the intersection of communications and 
cultural policy’. The Keating Government’s digital content framework was firmly 
embedded within a combined cultural and services policy framework which 
connected services based policy making (see Figure 1)with a revised and updated 
cultural policy program that recognised the economic dimensions of culture.  
The task of bringing together culture and services into a single, overarching and 
connected policy framework required the establishment of effective linkages between 
the content and cultural domain and the communications including broadcasting and 
telecommunication services. Content creation is in this mix the primary policy 
objective to be achieved through the creation of both a multimedia industry and the 
transformation of existing film, television, radio and newspapers industries (CoA, 
1994: 41). With the multimedia industry having the potential to become ‘the biggest 
information business in the world’ (CoA, 1994: 55), a Keating government policy 
priority was to create content production principally for consumer markets. To do so 
it would need to secure the cooperation of all players in the industry and to identify 
and pursue with them common ends (CoA, 1994: 41). This ambitious agenda drew 
together the creators of film, television and multimedia software, the broadcasters 
‘with [their] experience of mass marketing and distribution of content’ and the 
newspaper and publishing industries ‘to provide content and entrepreneurial skills’ 
(CoA, 1994: 42).  
The window of opportunity multimedia presented required the Australian government 
to re-assess policy settings across government. The three major reports of the first 
policy moment—Creative Nation, Commerce in Content and Networking Australia’s 
Future (BSEG 1994)—all took cognisance of each other in a whole of government 
approach representing a coherent multi-departmental analysis, projection and 
prescription for what were seen as the major challenges and opportunities facing 
Australia in making its transition to the information economy (CoA 1994: 62).  
An Industry Development Strategy 
Industry development priorities were central to Commerce in Content and Creative 
Nation. Creating a new multimedia industry was promoted as a departure for the 
Commonwealth in that “multimedia” and the “content industries” were the primary 
objects of policy. While existing industries like broadcasting and telecommunications 
would assist in the development of this multimedia industry the task was mostly 
conceived of as developing an industry from scratch. An industry would be brought 
into existence through a myriad of interlocking initiatives including a massive 
injection of funds, adjustments to bureaucratic administration and an information 
offensive. There were multimedia forums and ministerial statements. There was a 
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targeted educational agenda in the creation of Co-operative Multimedia Centres 
(CMCs). A new funding agency—the Australian Multimedia Enterprise (AME)—was 
created to finance digital content production and existing film and cultural agencies 
were funded to encourage the production of multimedia. Steps were taken to establish 
a ‘“world’s best” copyright administration environment’ (Cutler & Co, 1994: 21). 
Government positioned itself as a primary user and consumer of multimedia services 
and content through ‘direct initiatives by governments and their agencies, leveraging 
off their position as significant, users, custodians and producers of content’ (Cutler & 
Co, 1994: 39). Its best-practice in multimedia use was to act as a ‘catalyst to 
accelerate the process of building up capability’ (Cutler & Co, 1994: 39) while its 
commissioning activities would establish and nurture multimedia companies. Its 
embracing of online government would thus lead the transition to the new service 
environment. Government would also ensure that cultural institutions were 
significantly contributing to this development of multimedia capacity and 
infrastructure by encouraging multimedia uptake and production in the public 
broadcasting sector (ABC and SBS), and cultural organisations (supported by the 
Australia Council). An ambitious digital archive agenda for both the National Library 
and National Gallery was developed to set a national agenda for the digitisation of 
content and to ensure that these central national collecting and heritage institutions 
became active participants in online and multimedia platforms. By commissioning 
CD-ROMs involving material from major cultural institutions for Australian schools 
both the capacity of local multimedia producers would be enhanced and youth 
audiences for product developed.2  
 
In this mix private-public partnerships were writ large. Through its outsourcing and 
its funding programs government was facilitating ‘a platform for small Australian 
multimedia companies to gain a worldwide reputation’. Through attracting 
international publishers to set up Australian offices, Australians would be plugged 
into global networks and Australia would become an information publishing hub for 
the Asia pacific region (CoA, 1994: 55-56). Partnerships between the ‘US and 
European book publishers, record companies … film studios and newspaper and 
magazine publishers’ enticed to locate in Australia and emerging local firms was to 
stimulate and grow multimedia content development capacity and infrastructure 
securing in the process the necessary levels of investment (Cutler & Co, 1994: 35). In 
this context securing the Fox film studios for Sydney was both a bold private-public 
partnership and a model instance of this move to attract international “publishers” so 
as to enable the taking of Australia’s international film, television and multimedia to 
the world.  
 
This content development strategy consisted of three phases: a CD-Rom product 
focus for three to five years, followed by online PC services and finally broadband 
interactive services (CoA, 1994: 56; Cutler & CO 1994: 21). The focus of Creative 
Nation and Commerce in Content was on the first phase: stimulating the development 
of CD-Rom titles for the cultural, informational and educational markets. The 
Australian multimedia industry would both build from these markets and promote an 
Australian cultural identity through them. This emphasis was part of a widely held 
belief internationally at the time, which has since failed to materialise, that these 
markets—particularly the educational and information sectors—would see high 
economic growth (see Soloway 1998).  
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While the object was new the industry development strategies were familiar. With 
content creation facilitated by the existing cultural product and arts industries, these 
industries provided the conceptual base for thinking about support mechanisms for the 
new multimedia industry and about what the content industries or multimedia 
industries might be in the new environment. The ensuing cultural product/title focus 
turned on support being conceived, like it had been in film, as funding support to 
assist in the development of titles—the intermediate goal was the creation of ‘250 
world class titles per year’ (Cutler & Co, 1994: 21) AME thus resembled the film 
funding agency, the Film Finance Corporation, with a similar emphasis upon 
providing finance alongside private sources of funding.  
As a cultural product industry multimedia required the skills, creativity and talent of 
the cultural sector. To take advantage of the opportunities presented by this new 
knowledge-based industry, the cultural sector would need to be mobilised, even 
reskilled. As Creative Nation put it ‘our current strengths in creating for film, 
literature, music or art audiences provide a wonderful platform from which to build’ 
(CoA, 1994: 57). Not only did this make the cultural sector pivotal to the very 
definition of the multimedia industry and the creative infrastructure being 
painstakingly put together but it also directed governmental attention towards the 
interface between this cultural sector and the emerging interactive multimedia 
industry. Government called for greater dialogue and interaction ‘between the 
traditional content producers and the software experts’ (CoA, 1994: 57). With much 
of the talent identified as lying with creative arts people ‘with little experience in 
business’, the problem became one of ensuring ‘that good ideas can be turned into 
commercial product’ (CoA, 1994: 57). To remedy this situation the source for much 
of this talent—the cultural sector—would need to be mobilised for multimedia 
production. In making this happen education and training had a significant role to 
play. 
Because the ‘starting point’ was the need to ‘build a critical pool of talent with 
multimedia skills’ (CoA, 1994: 57) new training institutions—the CMCs—needed to 
be created which would link education and training including linkages to business and 
other public and private organisations around the country (CoA, 1994: 59). These 
CMCs were to ‘act as a resource for the multimedia industry at large while also 
accelerating the uptake of multimedia within the education and training centres’ of the 
University and TAFE sectors (CoA, 1994: 60).  
Multimedia industry development also required public education to orchestrate 
demand. On the one hand the federal government in conjunction with industry 
partners could sensitise public and private sectors alike as to the possibilities of 
multimedia for their activities, operations and business models. On the other hand it 
could prepare the ground for interactive multimedia product, create a public interest in 
them, and ensure that the public were both multimedia-minded and multimedia-
receptive. Creative Nation exhorted the public to ‘address the information revolution 
and the new media not with fear and loathing, but with imagination and wit’ turning 
its ‘remarkable power … to a democratic and creative cultural purpose’ (CoA, 1994: 
7). 
This was industry policy making with avengeance. If the multimedia content industry 
required the multimedia ready producer and consumer with the requisite 
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communications hardware, training, knowledge and desire, then government would 
do its best to provide these. There was pump priming through new monies being made 
available for product development. Comprehensive educational initiatives included 
the creation of new institutions and renovation of existing ones. An extensive 
governmentally sponsored information campaign would not only sensitise public and 
private sectors alike as to the possibilities of multimedia for their activities but also 
generate demand for multimedia product. Regulatory change through attention to 
copyright and its administration would provide the necessary environment for 
investment. Government procurement policies and practice would aid the 
development of industry capability. Government would mobilise diverse actors drawn 
from telecommunications, broadcasting, film, software development and the arts to 
facilitate a coherent, multifaceted multimedia industry. The Keating Government was 
attempting to fast-track industry development. It wanted to create the right mix of 
industry ingredients through public initiatives and funding to turn a barely existent 
industry into a high growth industry producing for a newly emerging global content 
market.  
 
Multimedia policy development was a central strut of the ‘the first national cultural 
policy’ statement in Australia’s history, Creative Nation. It was thus part of ‘one of 
the most comprehensive and forward-looking statements of government policy 
towards culture that had been seen anywhere in the world’ (Throsby 2001: 558). In 
creating synergies among and coherence from the disparate Commonwealth activities 
in the performing and visual arts, heritage, broadcasting, film, new media and 
education Creative Nation was adopting, as David Throsby put it, ‘a broad view of the 
cultural sector in which the arts occupied a central position, not just in their own right 
but also as the foundation upon which the wider cultural industries, especially those 
dependent on new communications technologies were built’ (Throsby, 2001: 558). By 
connecting culture, services, the emerging information economy and the existing 
economy this policy moment was able to categorically claim that ‘cultural policy is 
also economic policy’ (CoA, 1994: 7). Culture was pivotal here: it built wealth, 
employment, added value and was essential to innovation, marketing and design. 
 
Such development priorities fitted the rhetoric of the Keating government—an 
interventionist Labor government avowedly concerned with the “big picture”. It was 
in the business of remaking Australian institutions and forging a new beginning for 
Australia whether in Aboriginal reconciliation, multiculturalism, its Asian future or in 
the information age. Such a political agenda gave governmental initiatives an 
expansionist character with government seeing itself as an important primer and 
initiator of sectoral and community development. The result here was interventionist 
policy making designed to create and make room for a new industrial sector 
(multimedia), a new communications infrastructure (broadband), a new consumer and 
citizen (formed at the intersection of telecommunications, broadcasting and online 
government) and a reshaped cultural sector (itself a consequence of both the centering 
of culture and the embracing of a multimedia policy turning on the synergies between 
cultural activities and service industries). The already normative and prescriptive 
character of this policy making was joined by a strong implementation side through 
high profile public initiatives designed to realise and bring into being the future 
confidently predicted in these policy reports.  
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Centering the ICT Infrastructure for the Knowledge Economy 
 
The ICT industries have been viewed as comprising a spectrum of four key 
components—hardware, software, services and content. Considerable work 
has been undertaken at the infrastructure end of this spectrum. It is now timely 
to augment this with initiatives which focus on content and applications. 
(DCITA 2003b)  
 
The wider ICT industries need the content and applications industries in order 
to innovate new services and new ways for people to interact with information 
systems’ (DCITA & NOIE, 2002: 3). 
 
For better or worse content, the initiatives of Creative Nation were seen by the 
incoming conservative Howard government in 1996 as “Keating” initiatives. With 
Keating’s personal identification of himself and his government with culture, the 
content industries and new media the Howard government was concerned to step in 
the face of its predecessor in these areas. The word culture fell out of favour. 
Canberra insiders would later jokingly quip that, as a Labor Party word, it was best 
avoided. The Liberal Party argued in their pre-1996 election policy, Australia Online, 
‘commerce, not culture will be the driver of new applications and revenue’ (quoted in 
Green, 1996: 18). Governmental attention would be focussed on what Richard Alston 
called, in Opposition, the ICT industries. This brought with it attention to ‘what 
services are useful and valuable, what limits are placed on our services environment 
by Australia’s current infrastructure’ and ‘what regulatory framework will advance 
the industry and maximise the national interest?’ In these circumstances content was 
subsidiary to the agenda of better exploiting an abundant but underutilised 
infrastructure, of remedying ignorance related to new services and of developing 
appropriate regulatory models for a convergent communications environment (Alston, 
1996: 35).  
 
The Keating emphasis on the information revolution had become the Howard focus 
on “the information economy” and, in particular, a sophisticated and dynamic ICT 
industry and infrastructure. These Howard priorities find their apotheosis in the 
creation of the National Office for the Information Economy (NOIE) in 1997 as a 
separate executive agency to give a whole of government focus to its information 
economy priorities.3 With such an explicit agenda for the information economy 
revisiting content by the Howard government would need to wait on “content” 
becoming relevant to information economy and ICT industry development priorities.  
 
With the “content industries” no longer an explicit, central object of policy, there was 
a substantial disinvestment in multimedia. AME was sold off with remaining funds 
returned to the Treasury and CMCs were scaled down. While support for the “content 
industries” continued albeit at reduced levels through more traditional agencies such 
as the AFC, ABC, SBS and the Australia Council and a patchwork of government 
interactive media initiatives ( see QUT and Cutler & Co 2003: 51-52), there was now 
a lack of high impact and systemic attention towards the digital content sector. The 
DC&A industries started to find a formal place in these information economy 
priorities with the release of the Strategic framework for the Information Economy in 
December 1998. The sixth of its ten priorities was to ‘promote the integrity and 
growth of Australian content and culture in the information economy’ (DCITA 1998: 
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8). The subsequent development of the Creative Industries Cluster Study (CICS) in 
2002 (DCITA & NOIE 2002) was connected with this information economy priority 
in that it sought to establish where the creative industries might fit into these wider 
policy priorities. It also represented a response to industry calls for a refocus on the 
importance of digital content production (see AIMIA 2001).  
 
The Howard policy direction in this area was arguably set by the reports of the 
Information Policy Advisory Council (IPAC 1997) and the Information Industries 
Taskforce (IIT 1997) which in Prime Minister Howard’s words were ‘focused on 
establishing a framework for the development of the information economy, on 
widespread adoption of new technology and the development of the information 
industries’ (Howard 1997). The IPAC report is particularly notable for its 
recommendation that ‘standalone industry strategies’ be replaced by an ‘emphasis on 
information policy as the key driver of value across supply and demand, economy 
wide’ while the IIT report (commonly referred to as the Goldsworthy Report) 
confirmed the importance of the information industries and the information economy 
as sectors for governmental attention within an innovation policy framework. As 
Howard put it in a National Press Club speech on his government’s policy response to 
these reports ‘innovation will be a key driver of the competitiveness of firms and 
economies into the next century’ (Howard 1997).  
 
While the later Enabling our Future: A Framework for the Information and 
Communications Technology Industry (DCITA 2003a) has not added any new 
frameworks for action it usefully condenses much of this policy cycle’s thinking 
about the centrality of ICT to the national innovation system and to industry 
development generally (like its predecessors it does not consider the DC&A industries 
in any detail—a solitary paragraph devoted to one part of the sector—the games 
industry). For this report the information economy agenda from the late 1990s to early 
2000s whose principal vehicle was NOIE had the specific ends of ‘wealth [creation], 
international competitiveness, national security, social cohesion and cultural richness’ 
(DCITA, 2003a: 5). This centering of the knowledge-based information economy 
identified the critical issue facing Australia as the dual one of ‘its ability to develop 
and exploit intellectual capital’ and of harnessing the power of ICT. In this mix ICT 
had a much expanded role to play across the economy and society. It was no longer 
just an important industry with nearly 8% of GDP but it was also, more critically, a 
‘set of enabling technologies and related products and services which underpin the 
development of Australia as an “information” and “knowledge” economy’ (DCITA, 
2003a: 5). Indeed the boundaries between ICT industry and other industries were 
becoming progressively blurred as ICT products and services were increasingly 
integral to the activities of business in areas as diverse as mining and finance 
(DCITA, 2003a: 18).  
 
Howard government policy making focused on this enabling aspect of ICT, seeing its 
successful deployment as critical to achieving national goals across government, 
economy and society in security, defence, managing demographic change, science 
and innovation, education and health. Successful ICT deployment would improve 
productivity, drive business efficiencies, support innovation and deliver a strategic 
information capability which would allow Australia to achieve its broad national 
economic and social goals (DCITA, 2003a: 9). In this environment the new business 
opportunities turned on the capacity of firms ‘to develop new ICT-based products and 
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services which respond to the expanding role of ICT across the economy and society’ 
(DCITA, 2003a: 5). ICT had gone beyond the domain of the technical input to 
become ‘a key strategic resource’ for achieving organisational goals. In turn ‘high 
value added ICT-based products and services’ were dependent on innovation with 
ICT as ‘a core component of Australia’s overall innovation system and the national 
R&D infrastructure’ (DCITA, 2003a: 6).  
 
This time the transition to the information economy would have ICT as its core driver. 
Rather than “branding” itself as the place with the great creative infrastructure, 
Australia needed to brand itself ‘as a country with world-class ICT capabilities, 
companies and researchers’ (DCITA, 2003a: 8). As ICTs underpinned ‘the broader 
innovation process’ (DCITA, 2003a: 19) the priority was no longer the “Creative 
Nation” but instead “Technology Australia” (DCITA, 2003a: 12). ICT opened up for 
Australians ‘unprecedented convenience, flexibility, and choice about how 
Australians will live, learn, work, create, buy and sell’ (DCITA, 1998: 2). Like the 
earlier content industry ICT was an industry in its own right which had become 
central to a variety of other industries and in doing so became central to everything. If 
ICT policy making did not have to connect with the DC&A industries, the connection 
between DC&A and ICT needed to be a central element of the CICS. Figure 2 
provides a graphic representation of the model which emerged:  
 
Figure 2: The Digital Content and Applications Model  
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Creative Industries Cluster Study (CICS) 
Digital content comes back into consideration in the early 2000s as a subsidiary and 
sector specific priority of developing what the peak industry body, the Australian 
Interactive Multimedia Industry Association [now the Australian Interactive Media 
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Industry Association], called a ‘viable Australian digital content industry’ (AIMIA, 
2001: 2). Then DCITA Minister, Richard Alston, hosted a forum on digital content in 
Melbourne in June 2001 to gain a ‘better understanding of the development prospects 
and needs of content activities’. In late August of the same year he announced both a 
modest Broadband Production Fund to seed-fund broadband production and ‘an 
examination of opportunities that may emerge from the establishment of a cluster 
approach’ founded on the ‘creative industries engaged in the production of digital 
content and applications’ (DCITA & NOIE, 2002: 8). The result was a three year 
multi-levelled study designed to comprehensively map the nature, character, obstacles 
and issues facing the creative industries or DC&A industries.  
 
CICS’s first stage consisted of a preliminary analysis and mapping of the creative 
industries producing digital content and applications in Australia. Creative Industries 
Cluster Study, Stage One Report, tabled in May 2002 identified the key enterprises, 
their location and productivity drivers and barriers (DCITA, 2003b: 1) facing the 
industry. The second stage report The Production of Digital Content (Cutler & Co, 
2002: 5) ‘drilled down to an understanding of what is actually happening on the 
ground at a firm level’ with a focus on firms in the interactive games, interactive 
multimedia, advertising and education segments. The third stage involved developing 
comprehensive cluster intervention strategies on the basis of what was learned in the 
first two stages to ‘assist the creative industries to overcome barriers in the 
production, distribution and marketing of DC&A’ (DCITA & NOIE, 2002: 43). This 
third stage entailed a range of studies from the adequacy of existing statistical 
indicators (Pattinson 2003) to the role of the federal government as a market 
participant (Convergent Consulting, 2003a); from research and innovation systems to 
overcome the industry’s fragmented nature (QUT & Cutler & Co, 2003) to an 
assessment of the role being played by collecting institutions in building creative 
digital content markets (Xamax et al, 2003); from emerging distribution frameworks 
and their implications for production (Convergent Consulting 2003b) to a study of 
Australian access to overseas markets (Higgs and Kennedy, 2003). 
 
In stark contrast to the multimedia optimism of a decade earlier the DC&A industries 
were found to be small scale and fragmented. These industries did not form a 
distinctive domain separate from the content and creative industries. They were rather 
one of the four key components of the ICT industries alongside hardware, software 
and services. The ICT industries were found to need the DC&A industries ‘in order to 
innovate new services and new ways for people to interact with information systems’ 
(DCITA & NOIE 2002: 3). Digital content was now projected as an integral part of 
the broader ICT agenda. It was valued for its capacity to optimise and innovate both 
the ICT industries and the broader service industries. Developing a digital content 
industry—in variously ‘the creative digital industries’, the ‘digital content and 
applications industry’, the ‘digital media industries’ and the ‘interactive media 
industries’ to name a few terms used—had become a means to augment both the 
creative industries more generally and ICT industry and policy frameworks.  
 
This ICT focus transformed how the creative industries using DC&A were 
understood. While ‘levels of industry concentration, the geographical size of markets, 
and the nature of demand vary a great deal’ among the various creative industries 
common ground was found in their sharing of a common infrastructure ‘such as 
digital telecommunications network and other digital distribution channels’, and 
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common inputs ‘such as skills and digital equipment’ (DCITA & NOIE, 2002: 15). 
Their common attribute of a ‘digitised value chain’ ensured that DC&A were 
generically similar to the ICT sector as well as ICT being a constitutive feature of 
DC&A.  
 
DC&A is valued here for its intermediate functions. QUT and Cutler & Co (2003: 31) 
found that there was an increasing use of ‘DCA intermediate inputs’ by both the 
traditional content industries and creative industries and ‘especially … the wider 
service sector industries’. They argued that intermediate industry use of creative 
industry outputs outweighs final consumption across printing, publishing, motion 
picture, radio, libraries and other sectors (QUT & Cutler & Co 2003: 31). Here 
DC&A’s functionality, applications and interoperability are central and valued 
features. By playing this role demand for DC&A was growing steeply (DCITA & 
NOIE 2002: 6).  
 
In foregrounding the content industries connection with ICT, content was being 
redescribed. Rather than focusing on finished cultural products (movies, television 
programs, CD titles and other entertainment and educational commodities) for 
consumer mass markets, the focus instead was on the inputs to these traditional 
‘content’ forms and, other content (software programs, applications etc) produced in 
the context of firm inputs, business to business transactions, distribution and logistics. 
Content was here part of the services firms provide to other firms and the shaping of 
the final product through these inputs. Content was important now not in its own right 
but for its potential to enhance, enable and innovate not only the creative industries 
but also the broader service sectors including health and education. Digital content 
producers therefore became so many service providers who supplied valued inputs—
content and applications—for industry generally. The Howard Government strategy 
for the DC&A industries should be therefore to optimise an existing industry to 
enhance its contribution to both the creative industries and the wider economy. While 
it would be still the case that the creative industries that produce DC&A ‘exhibit 
characteristics of the ICT sectors as well as qualities of the creative industries’ 
(DCITA 2002: 1), governmental priority for this in-between industry would now 
partially disconnect it from the cultural sector so as to focus upon both its connection 
to the ICT domain and its business and industry development.  
 
Cluster Development as Industry Development 
The CICS is a mapping study. It is one of a number of similar studies being 
undertaken in Australia and internationally at the time and is focused on the character 
and nature of existing firms, their capabilities and their linkages.4 It identifies the 
barriers and outlines the opportunities for the development of the existing DC&A 
industries. It wants to know these businesses and the problems they face both to help 
these businesses to better know themselves and to formulate and facilitate cluster 
formation. Clusters are defined here as ‘groupings of firms with established links 
based on networks of activity’. Clusters can either be based on ‘geographical 
proximity’ or may be ‘virtual’ (DCITA & NOIE, 18). In the DC&A domain clustering 
involves ‘collaboration between small-to-medium sized firms [SMEs] in investment, 
production and distribution of content’ (DCITA & NOIE, 2002: 3) and is directed 
towards securing high levels of innovation and competitiveness (DCITA & NOIE, 
2002: 18). This happens because: 
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Firms working in close proximity, or with strong collaborative networks, are 
able to achieve cost advantages and innovations that increase productivity, 
creativity and competitiveness relative to firms outside the cluster. (DCITA & 
NOIE, 2002: 19) 
 
Clustering provides the means not only to analyse existing capability and 
competitiveness but also to conceptualise and develop policy measures to foster 
industry development and remedy barriers. It is therefore both an analytical 
framework to measure the health, depth and potential of these industries and a policy 
tool (DCITA & NOIE, 2002: 19). Australia’s DC&A industries were being mapped 
with a view to identifying existing and potential clusters and addressing barriers and 
market failures (DCITA & NOIE, 2002:3).  
 
The ‘embryonic and patchy’ character of Australian DC&A industries was a result of 
‘industry fragmentation and a small domestic market’ which ‘discourages the 
collaboration and long-term investment that underpins cluster development’ (DCITA 
& NOIE, 2002: 4). This suggests that intervention should be directed towards cluster 
development by bolstering ‘industry collaborative mechanisms’, creating and 
diffusing knowledge about prospective business models (DCITA & NOIE, 2002: 8) 
and re-orienting the horizon line of DC&A industries to global markets. The 
advantage of clustering is that in addressing both the enterprise-level and systemic 
capabilities it ‘allows the innovation, creativity and flexibility displayed by smaller 
firms to be incorporated as part of a larger industry structure and strategy’ (DCITA & 
NOIE, 2002: 21). By orientating themselves to global markets DC&A firms would 
have the incentive to collaborate in developing clusters as their attention would be 
shifted from competing for limited domestic market share towards establishing 
linkages with domestic competitors to access global markets. Clustering is also 
beneficial because it supplements direct assistance and support. Because innovation 
and R&D in digital production ‘revolves around the intangible creative capital formed 
by people skills, relationships, and collaborations’ (QUT & Cutler, 2003: 62) 
clustering is also an obvious mechanism to strengthen the national innovation system.  
 
The preferred Commonwealth option is not to force the development of clusters, but 
on OECD advice, to develop in partnership with industry the ‘building and 
strengthening of linkages and relationships judged to be valuable’ (DCITA & NOIE, 
2002: 22). This lighter touch policy (which also has the advantage of not requiring so 
much up-front investment from government) has the advantage of allowing the 
‘breadth of knowledge within industry, of industry needs, to determine and colour the 
exact shape of the growing lattice of linkages and relationships’ (DCITA & NOIE, 
2002: 22). This implies a policy for the DC&A industries which rests ‘primarily on 
data collection, information provision, and facilitation’ (DCITA & NOIE, 2002: 
22)—to better assist industry to know and help itself.  
 
Clustering was also appropriate to the DC&A industries given the economic and 
structural conditions under which content is increasingly being produced, distributed 
and marketed (DCITA & NOIE, 2002: 21). With the twin pressures of globalisation 
and digitisation pushing both clustering and consolidation alike as firms have to either 
band together and collaborate or be taken over by larger increasingly multinational 
firms. At the same time the wider and more complicated value chain for production, 
distribution and consumption accompanying digitisation (DCITA & NOIE, 2002:13) 
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exposed Australian digital content producers more directly to global competition in 
their local market than before.  
 
The Howard government’s industry development agenda for DC&A is a business 
transformation agenda (DCITA 2002: 1). It looks to optimise businesses through 
clustering and through this optimising and clustering create the right mix to stimulate 
a viable digital content industry. Business optimisation through clustering, resource 
pooling, skill and technology sharing when combined with government facilitation 
strategies will generate demand pull.  
 
When the Howard government returned to thinking in a sustained way about the 
digital content industries it explicitly distanced this policy making from its own 
cultural agenda. With an avowedly ICT- and innovation-based economic agenda the 
priority was placed on facilitating new business forms and cooperative arrangements 
(DCITA 2002: 1), developing commercial capabilities rather than focusing on cultural 
outputs (CICS, 2002: 4) and foregrounding connections with the ICT industries rather 
than with the cultural sector. By conceiving digital content as an innovation driver 
creative industry policy development was being taken ‘beyond the traditional 
“cultural” industries’ to include ‘areas like software development, industrial design 
and distributed computing’. In being concerned for ‘the capabilities that underwrite 
the content industries’ priority was being given to the ‘capacity to create and 
innovate’ (2002: 4) ensuring a close connection with larger innovation agendas. 
 
These policy priorities of the second moment fitted the more cautious priorities of the 
Howard government. It was less concerned with ‘social engineering’ than with 
governmental business facilitation—providing the conditions under which diverse 
actors from businesses to cultural organisations could get on with the business of 
responding effectively to an increasingly globalised world and bedding down ICT 
technology in their operations. The concern was with innovation, efficiency, and 
getting Australians to feel “comfortable” about their place in the wider global sphere. 
Policy makers were not concerned as in the earlier period with the development of 
consumer markets and the creation of consumer and citizens appropriate to a new 
global circumstance. Rather they were concerned with industry development through 
firm development. The natural proclivity of the Liberal National Coalition 
government towards industry facilitation and support—helping business to help 
itself—found expression in creative industries ‘clustering’ within a national 
innovation system policy framework. Clustering provided government with the 
perfect mechanism to present itself as pro-business and even pro-SME development. 
It also ensured that content production occurred under the auspices of enhancing its 
ICT framework. This fitted a government more attracted to facilitating an industry led 
strategy than with injecting large sums of money into industry development 
mechanisms as per Creative Nation.  
 
Evaluating the Two Policy Moments 
The first policy moment turned on a set of assumptions. It was assumed that a 
fundamentally new set of circumstances and therefore arrangements had come into 
being with the advent of the information age. So while multimedia would be built 
from the combination of existing industries it would surpass existing “media” and 
applications including telecommunications to create a new structural model 
incorporating these industries. Demand for content would drive the take-up and 
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innovation of communications infrastructure including the information superhighway. 
A “publishing model” which separated content from conduit was proposed as the 
governing metaphor for thinking about the relation between multimedia and the 
information superhighway instead of a broadcasting model where conduit and content 
were connected. Old media was called upon to assist in the birth of a new media 
which would be something more than this old media and eventually supercede them. 
And finally the exercise of various levers under governmental control such as cultural 
institutions, libraries, schools, funding agencies, the provision of governmental 
services and government’s capacity to mobilise public opinion would help create 
multimedia capacity, viable markets and sustainable demand for multimedia product.  
 
There were a number of difficulties with these assumptions. Convergence was not one 
big coming together but a lot of little things. The superhighway was not one grand 
highway but a network of roads of varying importance going in all sorts of directions 
and with different speed limits. Multimedia faced formidable obstacles in being 
projected as an industry in its own right. It did not have the pathways, transmission 
patterns, financing strategies, peer recognition and marketplace dynamics of the 
already existing media industries. Coming as it did after the dot.com crash of 2000 the 
later CICS process carefully demonstrated that ‘multimedia’ had mostly become an 
ancillary or intermediate part of existing industries. Far from interactive multimedia 
operating as a content industry it was mostly a service industry providing 
applications, ancillary value-adding content to programming and other fee-for-service 
work for both the media industries (e.g., Big Brother’s use of the web and SMS) and 
for other industries using ICT. With the singular exception of the games industry the 
prospects for the production of multimedia standalone content were decidedly bleak. 
Unsurprisingly the strategic focus shifted to a model of applications which positioned 
digital content in its provision of services—applications and solutions—to a variety of 
different industries. Industry priorities clearly needed to change one the real action 
was shown not to be in the information/educational/cultural arenas Creative Nation 
had banked on but in the entertainment sector with the games.  
 
The slower than expected uptake of broadband services and digitalisation caused a 
reorientation of governmental attention towards connectivity at the expense of 
content. The partial conflation of content provision and content production 
encouraged by the use of the publishing metaphor failed to recognise sufficiently the 
important structuring role of distribution, particularly distributor/content providers in 
organising markets. In circumstances where hardware providers may also be 
distributors—think of Foxtel in the Australian context—a too hard and fast distinction 
between content and carriage could be counterproductive ignoring as it does the 
market power of larger players in determining not only what travels along the ‘dumb 
pipes’ but what kind of pipes can come into existence in the first place.  
 
Proposing that the old media act as the hand maiden for the new media directed 
attention to the building of the new rather than the incremental transformation of the 
old. The need to conceive new media as a new beginning had the unfortunate 
consequence of conceiving opportunity in the blue sky terms of the dot.com book 
rather than as necessary incremental adjustments to existing communications and 
entertainment environments. It is now widely accepted that Australia cannot compete 
on the optimistic scale proposed in Creative Nation and Commerce in Content.  
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The use of cultural levers caused problems as the joint services and cultural 
framework led to power struggles between government departments responsible for 
communication and the arts, education and training and industry causing policy 
uncertainty, tensions and policy fragmentation (Butler, 1997: 16). Government had 
clearly overestimated the reach and capacity of itself and its agencies to effect 
industry wide outcomes. Industry development required a more robust, developed and 
resourced private sector. Finally, underpinning these assumptions, digitalisation did 
not happen with the predicted speed, impact or inevitability: indeed it has not fully 
happened particularly in new networked interactive services.  
 
While the second policy moment is still in process with much formulation and 
implementation still to occur, we can nonetheless identify very different assumptions 
at work and the new set of problems these create. There was the centrality of ICTs to 
innovation in the information economy, business productivity and national 
competitiveness. These ensured that the DC&A industries would need to seek a 
relation with ICTs rather than the cultural sector. The DC&A industries were valued 
as an enabler and an intermediate service provider not only for ICT-related industries 
but for the rest of the economy. The focus was placed at the level of the firm in a 
business transformation agenda for which cluster development was central. By 
centering the creativity and innovation system the clustering and R&D aspects of 
DC&A were foregrounded. And finally the government’s role was specified as a 
facilitator shaping in a collaborative fashion with industry partners the industry before 
it.  
 
The relationship with ICTs, the innovation agenda, and the information economy 
were productive in casting new light on unexamined areas. However, it cast the 
content industries into a supporting role for the ICT industries and other sectors. 
Being valued not for themselves but for what they could contribute to something else, 
the focus on DC&A industries’ enabling and intermediate characteristics turned them 
into a handmaiden for business transformation in these broader industries. This 
inhibited policy development for the cultural product industries and ensured that 
creative areas without significant ICT/digital components were being ignored. While 
the disconnection of culture from services helped demonstrate the significance of 
service provision in the cultural product industries it came at the cost of ‘bracketing 
off’ culture from the development of these DC&A industries. When combined with 
ad hoc support for the cultural industries over the latter half of the 1990s and limited 
attention to the creation of demand—particularly in broadband—it is not surprising 
that the industry was by the early 2000s still small and fragmented.  
 
The focus on the firm and business transformation through cluster development had a 
number of benefits. It had the advantage of not prescribing platforms or business 
sectors for attention. It clearly normalised content and its production. In usefully 
centering the production of content and attending to its processes, it provided much 
needed information about the army of firms collaborating on short term projects. But 
this attention came at a cost. It left demand creation as a by product of the perfecting 
of the business transformation. The quality of the processes, the internal health, and 
the collaborative networks and linkages being formed were all assumed to take care of 
market creation. The global policy enthusiasm for cluster development which is now 
exercised at all levels of government carries a number of downsides. Governments 
have limited capacity to develop clusters and to encourage their coming into 
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existence. In addition R&D frameworks are typically science and technology driven. 
This marginalises the contribution of the DC&A industries to R&D just as it requires 
these industries to fit models not especially suited to creative industries cluster 
development (QUT and Cutler & Co, 2003: 6).  
 
Playing the role of facilitator also has its limits. It can cause governments to be 
cautious. Governments can rely overly on acting through others who might not act in 
the desired fashion. It offers private industry indirect rather than direct financial 
benefits by way of subsidy and support. It also tends to underestimate the substantial 
levers at governmental disposal. Indeed the ‘benign’ neglect of the digitisation 
agendas of national collecting institutions is now widely seen to have had significant 
ramifications for the scope and depth of Australia’s creative industries. Further 
difficulties that arise with Howard Government’s facilitation strategy, which is 
canvassed in the Stage One report, is that the small fragmented Australian DC&A 
industry increasingly faces the risk of content marginalisation in a global market 
dominated by multinationals and strong public supported national digital content 
industries (such as UK and Canada). This raises the issue of whether a facilitation 
strategy would be enough to ensure Australian industry can gain traction in highly 
competitive markets.   
 
While there is large gap between the different logics animating these two respective 
policy moments, there are important continuities requiring further investigation. 
Several key people were involved in both policy moments.5 The Broadband agenda of 
Australia’s Broadband Connectivity like its predecessor has an important focus on the 
DC&A industries and the generation of demand for broadband services. Many of the 
arguments in From Cottages to Corporations and Australia’s Broadband Connectivity 
have direct counterparts in Creative Nation as market creation becomes increasingly 
seen as an issue in its own right. Are we seeing here the beginnings of a process 
whereby government is being forced to double-back and re-connect DC&A with the 
cultural industries and to refocus its attention on the drivers of broadband demand? 
Does this mean that the issues of convergence so central to the first policy moment 
where the information superhighway and content were inextricably linked in a 
virtuous circle of supply and demand will necessarily return? Can the Howard 
government’s strategic priorities centering ICT be shifted towards the content 
industries? Certainly the Howard government has never been as interested in joining 
up its various policy initiatives as was its Labor predecessors. It can tolerate the co-
existence of different governmental agendas with different ends advanced even by the 
same department. This would suggest that a DC&A and connectivity agenda would 
simply co-join an ICT agenda confirming in an uneasy way the ongoing gap between 
Enabling the Future and the various reports of the CICS and Australia’s Broadband 
Connectivity. 
 
While one is a cultural policy-derived industry development strategy, and the other a 
creative industries development strategy centering the provision of intermediate 
services, they both join up the various cultural industries and their creative inputs. In 
the first connecting culture with services enabled this joining up; while the shift to 
services industries models similarly joined up the creative industries. Where they 
principally differ is in the second’s industry development model focusing on the value 
chains, the firm and the cluster rather than the first’s attention to cultural form and 
format. It would be wrong to see culture as excluded through governmental attention 
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to clustering and SME development. Rather this attention shifts thinking about 
cultural assets and cultural production towards the enterprise dynamics of the creative 
industries. The emphasis upon the creative industries may have placed the traditional 
arts lower down in the pecking order of attention than the DC&A industries that 
supply intermediate services for the ICT, health, mining, finance and education but it 
is also reconceptualizing them. Indeed there might be a new round of policy attention 
directed towards the so-called core cultural sector emphasising clustering, networks 
and the provision of services. After all ‘[t]his economic agenda complements cultural 
policy by giving attention to the capabilities that underwite the content industries’ 
capacity to create and innovate’ (CICS, 2002: 4).  
 
The cultural sector—cultural institutions, libraries and museums, SBS and the ABC—
can still play an important role in digital content strategies... Take the CICS study on 
national Collecting Institutions (Xamax et al., 2003). Here the emphasis is on the 
economic benefits to be derived from cultural assets. As asset holders the collecting 
institutions are potential partners for creative industries firms wishing to use and 
exploit these cultural assets. Collecting institutions are not here the publishers and 
gateways of Creative Nation, instead they are providers of digitised versions of 
cultural objects for exploitation by creative enterprises (Xamax et al, 2003: 2). The 
challenge facing these institutions is to make available the right kinds of cultural 
objects under the right kinds of conditions. Culture would seem to make its return in 
this second policy moment as a service provider and partner for the creative 
industries. This is culture in the service of the service industries.  
 
While the digital content industries and culture may be coming back onto 
governmental horizons they are not having the centrality they enjoyed in Creative 
Nation. Digital content is not at the forefront of the Howard Government’s policy 
development agenda but the industry is back on the communications policy radar. 
Until proposals derived from the findings of CICS, are approved and implemented, 
particularly in future budgets, policy making for the digital content industries will 
remain on the periphery of governmental action agendas as research in search of 
policy implementation. While it is not clear if digital content will become 
foregrounded, marginalised, or remain a Government policy priority at all, the CICS 
process has provided sustained analyses of and prescriptions for the digital content 
industries which indicate the important role these industries could play in knowledge-
based policy frameworks. While these industries languish in governmental priorities 
the international significance of Australian DC&A initiatives lies in these 
frameworks.  
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1 The article is based on the examination of publicly available and publicly commissioned reports, 
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of each moment—reconstructing in the process the particular policy directions, inflections and 
assumptions animating each. 
2 24, 000 copies of the first two CD-Roms of the Australia on CD initiative were delivered to schools, 
libraries, universities and embassies across Australia (Butler 1997:16) 
3 NOIE became the Australian Government Information Office in March 2004 with broader policy, 
research and programs transferred to the Office for the Information Economy in DCITA.  
4 Most famously the British Creative Industries Task Force mapping studies of 1998 and 2001, the 
Creative Industries Research and Applications Centre (CIRAC) began a mapping project of the 
Creative Industries in Queensland in 2002, Paul Jeffcutt led a team to map creative industries in 
Northern Ireland.  
5 Terry Cutler was centrally involved in Commerce in Content and the later Producing Digital Content 
and Research and Innovation Systems in the Production of Digital Content. Peter Higgs was one of the 
conceptual contributes to Creative Nation and Australian Multimedia Enterprises and is co-author of 
From Cottages to Corporations and Economic Benefits from Cultural Assets.  
